The story we’re often told about Iran’s nuclear ambitions can be misleading, suggests independent journalist Gwynne Dyer. To truly understand the situation, he argues we should look back at a critical historical lesson: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
After his defeat in 1991, Saddam was forced to destroy his actual chemical weapons. Yet, in the early 2000s, he deliberately obstructed UN inspectors, creating the impression he still held dangerous “weapons of mass destruction.” Why? He wanted his many enemies—including the US—to fear him, hoping this bluff would deter attacks. It was a dangerous game that ultimately backfired, leading to the 2003 invasion, his capture, and execution. Saddam’s gamble, meant to protect him, led to his downfall.
Now, consider Iran. While its regime is indeed harsh, Dyer points out a crucial difference: Iran’s first Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, declared all weapons of mass destruction forbidden (haram) on moral and religious grounds. This wasn’t just rhetoric; during the brutal 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iranian soldiers died by the tens of thousands from Iraqi chemical weapons, yet Iran refused to retaliate in kind, adhering to the religious decree.
Iran’s nuclear program began peacefully in the 1970s. While there was some brief interest in a “threshold” nuclear capacity around 1998, it was halted. In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), limiting enrichment to civil levels (3.67%) in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran meticulously observed these limits.
However, in 2018, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal, likely at Israel’s urging, and reimposed crippling sanctions. In response, Iran began gradually increasing its enrichment levels, now reaching 60% – just a step away from weapons-grade. Dyer believes this isn’t necessarily a dash for a bomb, but a dangerous, calculated pressure tactic. Much like Saddam, Iran may be using nuclear ambiguity as a deterrent, albeit with a religious constraint against actual weapons, hoping to force international partners back to the negotiating table. It’s a high-stakes gamble, mirroring a game that ended badly for Saddam.
